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Innovation is the mantra and arguably the engine of the modern, knowledge-based 
political-economy, and biotech innovation is one of the central pillars of the new 
‘innovation society’.  Healthcare innovation – a key component of the biotech stream of 
innovation – is both an integral part of the innovation society and is reshaping that 
society, introducing new lexicons, redefining our understanding of desirable and 
undesirable bodily states, re-forging our relationships with our bodies, other people and 
the environment, and so on.1  An important facet of healthcare innovation is stem cell 
research (SCR); research exploring the functions of or relying on stem cells (SCs).  SCs 
are cells that divide asymmetrically; their division gives rise to an identical daughter cell 
(ie: thereby self-renewing) and to a differentiated cell (ie: one with a different and 
specialised function).  Although different SCs exhibit different levels of plasticity 
depending on when they are harvested,2 SCs no longer require proof of principle,3 and 
are generally accepted as a source of great potential for human welfare. 
This paper explores the moral controversy surrounding human embryonic SCR 
(hESCR) and assesses its legal position in Argentina.  An analysis of hESCR is 
important/timely because it is a much-hyped pursuit to which much hope is attached, 
and, simultaneously, a much-maligned pursuit to which much antipathy is directed.  
Frequently considered to be superior to adult SCR,4 hESCR is the site of mammoth 
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1  For insight into how SCR interacts with and influences culture, see C. Hauskeller. Science in 
Touch: Functions of Biomedical Terminology. Bio & Phil 2005; 20: 815-835.  She concludes that 
biomedical science (its aims and developments) is so closely related to the cultural milieu and to social 
aims and development that the realms are inseparable. 
2  Totipotent SCs, harvested from the 8 cells of the zygote at approximately 36-hours post-
fertilisation, can give rise to an entirely new organism, including the cells needed for human development.    
Pluripotent SCs, harvested when the inner cell mass of the blastocyst (ie: the mass which could otherwise 
form the embryo and evolve into the foetus) reaches approximately 25 cells, can differentiate into any and 
all of the 200+ cell types which comprise the human body, but cannot give rise to the extra-embryonic cells 
necessary to support the development of a foetus in utero.  Multipotent SCs, harvested from the primordial 
germline cells of early aborted foetuses or from mature tissue (eg: from any post-foetal stage of life of the 
organism, including the late foetus, umbilical cord blood, children and adults), can give rise to the cell 
types regenerative of the tissue in which they normally reside. 
3  A. Chapman et al. Report: Stem Cell Research and Applications: Monitoring Frontiers of 
Biomedical Research. 1999. Available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/stem/report.pdf [Accessed 2 
Oct 2006]. 
4  See K. Devolder. Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Why the Discarded-Created-Distinction 
bioethical clashes around unique issues relating to (1) the wellbeing of the embryo, the 
harvesting of which currently requires its destruction,5 and (2) the wellbeing of the 
collective, which is notionally threatened by certain processes associated with hESCR, 
most notably cloning, or ‘somatic cell nuclear transfer’ (SCNT6).  An analysis of hESCR 
(and SCR more generally) in Argentina is important/timely because Argentina is a 
southern, economically fragile, developing country that is actively pursuing regenerative 
medicine and SC solutions to health problems.  Indeed, Argentina is one of a handful of 
developing countries taking steps to build a competitive domestic market.7 
Given the above, Part I examines the bioethical concerns raised by hESCR and 
attempts to articulate the moral values exposed by these concerns.  Values are the 
underlying moral attitudes or foundation stones which tend to (1) justify the elevation of 
human life above other life, (2) elucidate the equality of all human life within the species, 
and (3) promote the wellbeing of and respect for persons.  Here, values are understood as 
the deeply held and sometimes unarticulated ideals and principles which we as a society 
and as individuals hold, and which move societies/communities to respond, either 
positively or negatively, to possibilities.8  Part II shifts its consideration to the translation 
of these moral values (and ethical positions) into compelling action-guiding rules.9  It 
assesses how these underlying values have manifested (if at all) in regulatory instruments 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cannot be Based on the Potentiality Argument. Bioethics 2005; 19: 169-186, p. 169.  For more on why 
researchers prefer ESCs, see R. Lovell-Badge. The Future of Stem Cell Research. Nature. 2001; 414: 88-
91, and A. Newhart. The Intersection of Law and Medicine: The Case for Providing Federal Funding for 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research. Vill Law Rev. 2004; 49: 329-361.  For a contrary view, see B. Capps. 
Bioethics and Misrepresentation in the Stem Cell Debate. 2005. Available at 
http://www.ccels.cardiff.ac.uk/literature/publications/2005/capspaper.pdf [Accessed 15 Mar 2006], L. 
Epatko. Adult Stem Cells: Conflicting Research. 2004. Available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/stem-cells/conflicting-research.html [Accessed 3 Oct 2006], and M. 
Shamblott et al. Derivation of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Cultured Human Primordial Germ Cells. NAS 
Proceedings. 1998; 95: 13,726-13,731. 
5  B. Salter & C. Salter. Bioethics and the Global Moral Economy: The Cultural Politics of Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Science. 2006. Available at 
http://www.ioh.uea.ac.uk/biopolitics/publications/working_papers/wp3.pdf [Accessed 5 Oct 2006].  They 
state that hESCR generates cultural conflict not because its subject is SCs but because its subject is hESCs. 
6  SCNT is a process whereby the nucleus of an adult cell is inserted into an enucleated egg, which is 
then induced to divide, thereby producing a blastocyst that is a genetic match to the adult cell/nucleus 
donor.  For SCR purposes, the resulting cloned blastocyst is not permitted to develop into a full embryo; 
rather the pluripotent ESCs of the blastocyst are harvested and can then be used to treat the donor/patient 
without fear of immunological responses.  This process is called therapeutic cloning, and is contrasted with 
reproductive cloning only in so far as its purpose rather than its technique is different.  If the purpose of 
SCNT is human reproduction, the blastocyst would be implanted in a woman’s uterus and permitted to 
grow into a baby.  See Select Committee. 2002. Stem Cell Research Report. London: House of Lords.  
Available at http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/pa/ld200102/ldselect/ldstem/83/8301.htm 
[Accessed 26 Sep 2006]. 
7  H. Greenwood et al. Regenerative Medicine: New Opportunities for Developing Countries. Int J 
Biotech. 2006; 8: 60-76; K. Thorn. World Bank Working Paper: Science, Technology and Innovation in 
Argentina: A Profile of Issues and Practices. 2005. Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/intargentina/resources/sciencetechnologyandinnovationinargentina.pdf 
[Accessed 3 Oct 2006]. 
8  For more on values, see S. Harmon. Regulation of Human Genetics and Genetic Biotechnology: 
Risks, Values and Analytical Criteria. InnoGen WP-40.  2005. Available Available at 
http://www.innogen.ac.uk/assets_innogen/dynamic/1132844739842/Innogen-Working-Paper-40.pdf; A. 
Bruce & J. Tait. Interests, Values and Biotechnological Risk. InnoGen WP-7. 2003. Available at 
http://www.innogen.ac.uk/assets_innogen/dynamic/1118847372616/Innogen-Working-Paper-7.pdf. 
9  For more on the translation of values into binding rules, see S. Harmon. Ibid.; K. Henley. Abstract 
Principles, Mid-Level Principles and the Rule of Law. Law & Phil. 1993; 12: 121-132; M. Bayles. Moral 
Theory and Application.  Soc Theo & Pract. 1984; 10: 110-114. 
relevant to hESCR in Argentina.  The paper concludes with an assessment of the 
adequacy of Argentina’s regulation and some suggestions for moving forward. 
 
ETHICAL DEBATES AND MORAL VALUES UNDERPINNING hESCR 
 
Positions on the use of the embryo turn on an assessment of three overlapping questions 
relating to the (pre)individual (eg: When does human life begin? What is the moral status 
of the embryo? What is the meaning of personhood?), and a balancing of our conflicting 
obligations relating to the collective (ie: our obligation to take action intended to alleviate 
the social damage caused by serious injury and debilitating disease, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, to avoid the potential social damage caused by the outputs of those actions).  





This position holds that human life and personhood occur simultaneously at the moment 
of conception, and the embryo’s unique potential to develop into a complex organism 
substantially different from any other known entity endows it with a right to special 
protection.10  Thus, it is immoral to take any action which prevents the embryo from 
fulfilling its potential.  Emphasising the risks over the (potential) benefits of hESCR, it 
expresses concern over instrumentalisation and questions the morality of a society (and 
the position of individuals within it) which routinely destroys early human life for 
inquisitive purposes.  A component of this argument is the claim that hESCR is too 
closely tied to SCNT; advances in therapeutic SCNT (intended to increase the number of 
SCs available and to eventually overcome immunological responses in patients), 
eliminate important obstacles to the acceptability of reproductive SCNT (eg: lack of 
safety11) with the result that hESCR constitutes a slippery slope to the eventual 
(inevitable) application of SCNT as a means of reproduction, which raises a host of 
social woes.12  As such, proponents would prohibit procuring or using hESCs, or indeed 
                                                 
10  See J. Deckers. Why Current UK Legislation on Embryo Research is Immoral: How the Argument 
from Lack of Qualities and the Argument from Potentiality Have Been Applied and Why They Should be 
Rejected. Bioethics. 2005; 19: 251-271; Pontifical Academy for Life. Declaration on the Production and the 
Scientific and Therapeutic Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells. 2000. Available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pa_acdlife_doc_20000824
_cellule-staminali_en.html [Accessed 18 Oct 2006]; R. Doerflinger. Destructive Stem-Cell Research on 
Human Embryos. Origins. 1999; 28: 769-773. 
11  Currently, SCNT is inefficient and, for reproductive purposes, both ineffective and unsafe: see the 
survey of scientific opinions in G. Annas & S. Elias. Politics, Morals and Embryos. Nature. 2004; 431: 19-
20, at fn 13 and 90.  As such, there is an international consensus to the effect that it is unethical: see Article 
11 of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), Article 1 of the 
Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol on Cloning Protocol (1998), and others.  See also R. Chester. 
Cloning Embryos from Adult Human Beings: The Relative Merits of Reproductive, Research and 
Therapeutic Uses. New Eng LR. 2005; 39: 583-607.  It has been postulated, however, that once our 
understanding increases such that reproductive SCNT is safe, the prevailing consensus may disintegrate: R. 
Brownsword. Stem Cells and Cloning: Where the Regulatory Consensus Fails. New Eng LR. 2005; 39: 
535-571. 
12  It is claimed that reproductive cloning would: cause emotional and psychological suffering in 
clones due to a lack of sense of independent self; infringe the clone’s autonomy through parental selection 
practices which impose characteristics that circumscribe their ability to experience an ‘open future’; 
compromise the clone’s dignity due to the ‘unnatural’ intervention in the reproductive process that spawned 
him/her; create confusion and ambiguity around familial relationships; alter the culture of reproduction 
such that children would be seen as commodities with characteristics to be bartered and selected; encourage 
conducting embryonic research, for any purpose other than assisting reproduction. 
This position relies on two overarching core values.  The first, ‘human dignity’, 
generally encapsulates the idea that individuals must be afforded honour and respect, and 
that the human species has a unique value which must be maintained through enhanced 
protection.13  A violation of dignity occurs whenever an act directed toward another is 
viewed, on an objective basis, as humiliating, insulting, shameful, contemptuous or 
damaging to the whole of humanity.  In this respect, dignity is deployed as a constraining 
mechanism, with its limits determined by some authority and imposed on everyone.  The 
second value, ‘sanctity of life’, generally connotes an aversion to harm and an elevation 
of human life above all other forms of life.14  In a similarly dogmatic vein, sanctity is 
interpreted such that human life is deemed intrinsically valuable/sacred and deserving of 
priority over all other considerations, including comfort, health, actualisation, and the 




Proponents of this position adopt comparable stances on the commencement of human 
life and personhood and similar interpretations of dignity and sanctity, which values 
figure prominently in their ethical judgment.  However, they marshal these in support of 
a less strict (and less consistent) approach to using hESCs.  They would prohibit 
procuring hESCs, but would allow research to continue on those cell lines already in 




Proponents of this position believe that, though genetically human, the embryo has none 
of the necessary characteristics of personhood (eg: uniqueness, sentience, and the 
cognitive capabilities of consciousness, reasoning and self-awareness).16  Drawing 
                                                                                                                                                 
a culture of market and consumption around children (made worse by inevitable disreputable cloners and 
consumers); and encourage eugenic selection processes and discriminatory attitudes based on new 
categories.  In short, children would be either ‘damaged goods’ or ‘finished goods’, but they would be 
‘goods’ in the instrumental meaning of the word.  Families would be confusing morasses with greater 
potential for exploitation, and society would become more discriminatorily balkanised with negative 
knock-on effects for justice.  See B. Taylor. Whose Baby Is It? The Impact of Reproductive Technologies 
on Kinship. Hum Fert. 2000; 8: 189-195; R. Santorum. The New Culture of Life: Promoting Responsible 
and Appropriate Medical Research. Notre Dame JLEPP. 2003; 17: 151-156; C. Sunstein. Is There a 
Constitutional Right to Clone? Hastings LJ. 2002; 53: 987-1005; L. Andrews. Is There a Right to Clone? 
Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning. Harv J Law & Tech. 1998; 11: 643-681; L. Wu. 
Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is There a Fundamental Right? Col LR. 1998; 98: 1461-1515; 
D. Davis. Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future. Rutgers LJ. 1997; 28: 551-592. 
13  M. Cutter. 2004. Genetic Databases and What the Rat Won’t Do: What is Dignity at Law? In 
Blood and Data: Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Human Genetic Databases. G. Arnason et al., eds. 
Reykjavik: UIP: 217-222, p. 219. 
14  P. Suber. Against the Sanctity of Life. 1996. Available at 
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/sanctity.htm [Accessed 5 Aug 2005]. 
15  The US federal funding policy of supporting research on SC lines created before 2001, but not 
permitting the creation of new lines represents such a bifurcated approach, which, coincidentally, leaves 
private sector conduct unregulated, and has been described as ethically inconsistent: see BBC, Bush ‘Out of 
Touch’ on Stem Cells. 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5197926.stm [Accessed 
18 Oct 2006].  For US opinion polls on SCR, see http://www.pollingreport.com/science.htm. 
16  For an interesting discussion on the status of the embryo, see H. McLachlan. Persons and Their 
Bodies: How We Should Think About Human Embryos. Health Care Analysis. 2002; 10: 155-164. 
support from religion, biology, and law,17 they argue that, although embryos are 
deserving of some ‘moral awe’,18 they are not sacrosanct.  As such, using embryos left 
over from IVF treatment for virtuous ends is more consonant with attributing moral 
status to them than is destroying them.19  By utilising existing embryos before they are in 
a position to ‘experience’ loss, this position affords them moral status (greater than if 
those embryos were simply discarded).  They stipulate, however, that embryos must 
never be created for the sole purpose of destruction/research; to do so would be to legally 
create an underclass of beings with a purely instrumental role in society.20 
Like those above, permissive proponents rely on dignity and sanctity.  However, 
dignity is viewed as an empowering value.  Espousing a subjective interpretation, 
proponents perceive a violation of dignity whenever an act is perpetrated against another 
which that other considers humiliating, insulting, contemptuous or damaging (ie: its 
breach depends on the individual’s sensibilities).21  Sanctity refers not to the un-utilisable 
sacredness of life, but to the uniqueness of the lived human experience (beyond mere 
biological existence), thereby taking into account other life interests (eg: health, comfort, 
social interaction).22  These interpretations implicate another core value: ‘autonomy’, 
which encompasses physical and psychological liberty and the right to be free from 
coercion within the reasonable limitations imposed by cherished relationships (eg: 
familial or community).23  Thus, proponents afford respect to individuals by recognising 
their autonomous right to make moral judgments (about their embryo and research) and 




This position views the embryo as nothing more than a collection of cells like that of 
other bodily tissue.  Demanding consistency, proponents argue that, if it is morally 
acceptable to create embryos to help the infertile (or to conduct pre-implantation genetic 
diagnoses), it can be no less moral to create them to help the ill or injured (or for research 
that will benefit the ill/injured).  Moreover, the most ethically and practically defensible 
                                                 
17  See H. Greely. Moving Human Embryonic Stem Cells from Legislature to Lab: Remaining Legal 
and Ethical Questions. PLOS Medicine. 2006; 3: e143; C. Dabu. Stem-Cell Science Stirs Debate in Muslim 
World Too. 2005. Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0622/p15s02-wogi.html [Accessed 29 Sep 
2006]; L. Cahill. The Embryo and the Fetus: New Moral Contexts. Theo Studies. 1993; 54: 124-142. 
18  A term used by A. McCall-Smith & M. Revel (Rapporteurs). 2001. Report to the IBC: The Use of 
Embryonic Stem Cells in Therapeutic Research. Paris: UNESCO. Available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/file_download.php/64b74abda57372bdc22570b42c1718f1stemcells_en.pdf 
[Accessed 5 Oct 2006]. 
19  R. Isasi & B. Knoppers. Beyond the Permissibility of Embryonic and Stem Cell Research: 
Substantive Requirements and Procedural Safeguards. Hum Reproduction. 2006; 21: 2474-2481, p. 2477. 
20  W. Cheshire Jr. Small Things Considered: The Ethical Significance of Human Embryonic Stem 
Cell Research. New Eng LR. 2005; 39: 573-582. 
21  For more on this, see D. Statman. Human Dignity and Technology. 2004. In Arnason et al., op. cit. 
note 13, p. 223-228; A. Capron. Indignities, Respect for Persons, and the Vagueness of Human Dignity. 
2003. Available at http://bmjjournals.com/cgi/eletters/327/7429/1419#44060 [Accessed 2 Aug 2005]; D. 
Beyleveld & R. Brownsword. 2001. Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw. Oxford: OUP. 
22  K. Boyd. Medical Ethics: Principles, Persons, and Perspectives: From Controversy to 
Conversation. J Med Ethics. 2005; 31: 481-486. 
23  Harmon, op. cit. note 8; R. Scott. 2002. Rights, Duties and the Body. Oxford: Hart Publishing; S. 
Aksoy & A. Elmali. The Core Concepts of the ‘Four Principles’ of Bioethics as Found in Islamic Tradition. 
Med Law. 2002; 21: 211-224; T. Beauchamp & J. Childress. 1994. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. 
Oxford: OUP.  R. Gillon. Ethics Needs Principles - Four Can Encompass the Rest - and Respect for 
Autonomy Should be ‘First Among Equals’. J Med Ethics. 2003; 29: 307-312, argues that autonomy must 
be respected if morality is to exist. 
position for a diverse, pluralistic society, they claim, is one which affords individuals, 
and therefore society, options.  Society must not be held hostage to the restrictive beliefs 
of a minority.24  Rather, our obligation to do everything possible to alleviate the suffering 
of existing and future human beings must be approached robustly; intergenerational 
justice demands that we enhance the life chances of emerging and future generations.25  
Positive action must be undertaken even where such action incurs costs and/or creates 
risks.  If hESCR has the potential to achieve this social end, then, despite its costs, there 
is a moral duty to pursue it and the limitations imposed on its pursuit must be minimal 
and narrow.26  Given the above, proponents of this position view (1) the use of embryos 
surplus from IVF, and (2) the creation of embryos for research purposes either through 
IVF-facilitated gestation or through SCNT as acceptable.  That is not to say that every 
use is acceptable; frivolous uses (eg: for the creation of cosmetics or for use in animal 
feed) diminish the moral respect shown to the embryo and are unacceptable.  But 
generally, conducting controversial research in the absence of knowledge about its 
ultimate social impact is acceptable and must be permitted because such research may 
prove beneficial to society.27 
Proponents attach great importance to autonomy, giving full credit to the 
individual’s right to make choices and take actions based on personal beliefs; indeed, 
they insist that the state must enable individuals to do so.28  As such, donors must be 
empowered to gestate and offer embryos for research and the betterment of humanity.  
Similarly, researchers must be given latitude in exercising their moral right to pursue 
scientific knowledge.29  The value of ‘solidarity’ is also implicated.  Solidarity recognises 
that individuals are naturally and irrevocably embedded in social contexts and thus have 
a duty – grounded in compassion, fraternity, interest in human welfare, and a desire to 
construct a just and decent society where everyone’s life chances are supported – to 
undertake personal and collective actions to promote the welfare of individuals and 
society; enhancing the health and quality of life of living and future humans is 
imperative.30  Although autonomy and solidarity often in conflict, this position ties them 
together through its claim that the moral life requires positive action in response to 
identified, response-demanding human needs, and that individuals must therefore be 
                                                 
24  K. Devolder. What’s in a Name? Embryos, Entities and ANTities in the Stem Cell Debate. J Med 
Ethics. 2006; 32: 43-48; J. Childress. An Ethical Defence of Federal Funding for Human Embryonic Stem 
Cell Research. Yale JHPLE. 2001; 2: 157-165. 
25  It is a curious juxtaposition that sees proponents of this position invoking the wellbeing of future 
individuals to justify use of embryos to which they attach no significant moral value. 
26  O. Corrigan et al. Ethical, Legal and Social Issues in Stem Cell Research and Therapy. 2005. 
Available at http://www.eeescn.org.uk/pdfs/elsi_paper.pdf [Accessed 3 Oct 2006], p. 6. 
27  J. Shaw. Stem Cell Science: When Medicine Meets Moral Philosophy. 2004. Available at 
http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/070483.html [Accessed 29 Sep 2006], quotes Prof. R. Losick 
making a similar argument in the context of the academic world (ie: universities have a responsibility to 
support controversial basic research on the understanding that it may or may not be beneficial to the world). 
28  Beauchamp & Childress, op. cit. note 23, p. 125. 
29  A right that is well established at international law: see provisions in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant of Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Universal 
Declaration of the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), and the Preliminary Draft Declaration on 
Universal Norms on Bioethics (2005). 
30  S. Harmon. Solidarity: A (New) Ethic for Global Health Policy. Health Care Analysis. 2006; 14: 
215-236.  See also S. Benatar, A. Daar & P. Singer. Global Health Ethics: The Rationale for Mutual 
Caring. Int Aff. 2003; 79: 107-138; R. Houtepen & R. ter Meulen. The Expectation(s) of Solidarity: Matters 
of Justice, Responsibility and Identity in the Reconstruction of the Health Care System. Health Care 
Analysis. 2000; 8: 355-376; R. ter Meulen et al. Final Report: Solidarity and Care in the European Union. 
2000. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/biosociety/pdf/bmh4_ct8_3971_partb.pdf [Accessed 
24 Aug 2005]. 
empowered to undertake that positive action.  The fact that new ideas and technologies 
create controversy and resistance (because they challenge existing thinking, boundaries 
and visions of the world) is of little consequence. 
 
Summation: legitimate plurality and enduring controversy 
 
Although the motivating interests of the proponents of the competing positions have not 
been investigated, it is clear that each position is grounded in fundamental moral values 
aimed at promoting a just and moral society.  Moreover, and perhaps ironically given the 
irreconcilability of these positions, they are grounded in a relatively small pool of moral 
values, which values have been interpreted in conflicting though not necessarily 
unreasonable ways.  The resultant moral plurality bears out a claim articulated by Rawls 
that irresolvable comprehensive conceptions of the good lie within the limits of reason, 
thereby constraining our capacity for agreement.31  The moral foundation of the present 
plurality – a plurality symptomatic of a globally communicative modern society that has 
become subjective and individualistic32 – has disinclined proponents of one position from 
conceding to the others’ positions.  In short, a consensus on the acceptability and scope 
of hESCR has been and will remain elusive, even within relatively small juridical 
boundaries.33 
So what is to be done?  In a democratic setting, with institutions geared toward 
enabling personal freedom and plurality, we might rely on the personal morality of actors 
within the field.  Indeed, such an approach would likely suit certain actors.  However, in 
a deeply divisive field like hESCR – which, in addition to morality, implicates commerce 
and development, technology and innovation, public and private actors, and individual 
and public health, present and future – stakeholders might rightly claim that public, not 
private, morality is important, and they may reasonably demand that actors be bound by 
something more than personal judgments based on individually-held values – something 
more coercive.  The most appropriate and effective form of coercive boundary-setting is 
legislated regulation: 
 
[Given that] … pluralism makes it impossible to presuppose a system of 
norms of correct behaviour which can be comprehended by everyone 
and accepted by all members of society … positive law … must serve 
the social order … and be strong enough to end the struggle of 
convictions and competing interests.34 
 
                                                 
31  See J. Rawls. 1993. Political Liberalism. NY: Columbia U. Press; and the comments on same in 
A. van de Putte. Rawls’ Political Liberalism: Foundations and Principles. Ethical Perspectives. 1995; 2: 
107-129; J. Rawls. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. U Chi Law Rev. 1997; 64: 765-807; O. O’Neill. 
Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls’ Political Liberalism. Phil Rev. 
1997; 106: 411-428. 
32  H. Sandkühler. Pluralism and the Universality of Rights. 1998. Available at 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/papers/law/lawsand.htm [Accessed 9 Mar 2007]. 
33  McCall-Smith & Revel, op. cit. note 18, state that status or personhood arguments have been 
prolonged and marked by utter failure to reach agreement.  Lack of consensus is exemplified at the 
international level by the prolonged attempt to realise an international declaration on cloning technology 
and the politics surrounding its eventual failure in February 2005: see UN, Press Release: Legal Committee 
Recommends UN Declaration on Human Cloning to General Assembly: UN Doc. GA/L/3271, February 
18, 2006. Available at http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2005/ga13271.doc.htm [Accessed 10 Oct 2006].  
See also L. Walters. Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Intercultural Perspective. Ken Inst Ethics 
J. 2004; 14: 3-38. 
34  Sandkühler, op. cit. note 32. 
However, it has been suggested that excessive legal coercion with inadequate common 
deliberation and discussion causes democratic societies to perish.35  The answer to such 
concerns is deliberative democracy, which, through multiple engagement mechanisms, 
requires stakeholders to justify their demands for collective action by giving (and 
debating) reasons that can be accepted by those ultimately bound by decisions.  Indeed, it 
is said that deliberative democracy (1) promotes openness and fairness, and minimise 
strategic manipulation, (2) promotes respectful decision-making in morally conflictual 
settings, (3) reduces the chance and consequences of acting with incomplete 
understanding, (4) promotes legitimacy in the face of decisions surrounding scarce 
resources, and (5) encourages solidaristic perspectives on public issues.36  Though 
deliberative exercises may never achieve consensus around the scope of hESCR (because 
of the well-articulated, entrenched plurality outlined above), and therefore derivative 
statutory regulation may not represent public articulation of universally accepted 
behavioural norms, where outputs clearly draw on widely held values openly debated, 
deliberative democracy-spawned regulation is valid and plays an important role in the 
construction of a just and moral society.37  Indeed, only through the use of deliberative 
democracy (public engagement) can we be reasonably confident that (1) all interested 
stakeholders have participated, (2) all actors have adequate notice of socially acceptable 
conduct, and (3) all actors are subject to the same mechanisms for enforcing that conduct, 
all of which are morally defensible elements of a pluralistic democracy.  There is 
obviously a risk that such an exercise will result in a regime that restricts conduct and 
therefore thwarts research, but that is a matter for (further) social/political negotiation. 
 
REGULATION AND CONTROL OF hESCR IN ARGENTINA 
 
Argentina has not enacted any law which explicitly governs hESCR, or the related fields 
of IVF or embryonic research, nor even articulated much in the way of public policy on 
same.38  Indeed, the only statutory instrument potentially relevant to hESCR is the 
Prohibition on Human Cloning Research (1997 Decree),39 which, it must be conceded, is 
silent on matters relevant to SCR except insofar as cloning is closely associated with 
hESCR.  Thus, although the 1997 Decree is directed at cloning, and therefore only 
tangentially impacts on hESCR, and although it was not arrived at deliberatively after 
public debate, it will nonetheless be the subject of the remainder of the analysis, which 
will assess its content in relation to the (pre)individual and the collective, both of which 
are, as demonstrated above, the subject of moral concern. 
 
                                                 
35  J. Bohman. Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral 
Conflict. Pol Theory. 1995; 23: 253-279. 
36  P. Hamlett. Technology Theory and Deliberative Democracy. Sci Tech & Human Values. 2003; 
28: 112-140; A. Gutmann & D. Thompson. Deliberating About Bioethics. Hastings Centre Report 27. 
1997; 3: 38-41.  For more on deliberative democracy, see A. Gutmann & D. Thompson. 1997. Democracy 
and Disagreement. Boston, MA: HUP; E. Charney. Political liberalism, Deliberative Democracy and the 
Public Sphere. Am Pol Sci Rev. 1998; 92: 97-110; J. Dryzek & C. List. Social Choice Theory and 
Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation. Brit J Pol Science. 2003; 33:  1-28; J. Dryzek Deliberative 
Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia. Pol Theory. 2005; 33: 218-242. 
37  And the law must be seen as ethically sound if it is to operate effectively (ie: be observed by its 
target population): Capps, op. cit. note 4. 
38  Isasi & Knoppers, op. cit. note 19, p. 2475.  F. Arzuaga, e-correspondence dated October 30, 
2006, indicates that there have been no official government position papers or reports on SCR to date, 
though the Science & Technology Promotion Agency created an Advisory Commission on Stem Cells in 
October 2006, which Commission has not yet produced its opinion. 
39  Presidential Decree No. 200/1997. 
Legal protections for the (pre)individual 
 
The only substantive provision of the 1997 Decree is Article 1, which states that ‘all 
cloning experiments relating to human beings are prohibited’.40  Assessed in its own right 
(as an explicit prohibition of a specified, though not well-defined scientific activity), its 
intent is self-evident and one can reasonably assume that its motivating ethical position is 
the restrictive position with its concomitant underlying values.  Reference to its Recitals 
only adds minimally to our understanding of Argentina’s position.  For example: 
 
• Recital 1 states, inter alia, that it is the inviolable duty of the state to defend the 
dignity of the human being.41  Although it fails to define its interpretation of 
human dignity, the 1997 Decree deploys it in the constraining sense.  One can 
therefore assume that the legislators felt cloning would diminish human dignity in 
some way, though it is wildly speculative to offer any insight as to how they may 
have thought it did so. 
 
• Recital 3 states that scientific advances in the public domain have resulted in 
human cloning research being possible, thereby creating ethical and moral 
problems that run contrary to the values and customs of the people.42  This is 
further reference to a moral foundation, but there is no reference to the specifics 
of the ethical/moral problems envisioned, nor, more importantly, aside from the 
previous bland reference to dignity, is there any articulation of what the “values 
and customs” of the people might be and how they impact on the individual. 
 
• Recital 6 states that the government has taken account of the opinions of different 
religious groups and scientific institutions, and the positions of different countries 
that have adopted a view on the subject.43  However, it gives no hint as to which 
groups/institutions/states it considered or found compelling, and so, again, one is 
left in the dark as to the precise moral foundation of the prohibition. 
 
Given the above, although there are gigantic gaps in the teachings discernable from the 
1997 Decree’s very curt and minimalist text, it  can be inferred that constraining and 
restrictive interpretations of dignity and sanctity are operative.  Somehow cloning 
diminishes the dignity of the individual and it must therefore be prohibited.  From this we 
can infer that, to the extent that the prohibition is motivated by a desire to protect the 
individual at all, it effectively translates these motivating values into legal rules (ie: 
constraint is the order of the day). 
But what might this position on cloning say about Argentina’s position on 
hESCR, and, more particularly, the position of the embryo (pre-individual) and donor 
                                                 
40  Article 1 states, “El Presidene de la Nacion Argentina en Ecuerdo General de Ministros Decreta: 
Prohíbense los experimentos de clonación relacionados con seres humanos”.   The remaining 3 provisions 
of the 1997 Decree merely direct further action and stipulate that the 1997 Decree is to be inscribed as the 
law of the land. 
41  Recital 1 states, “Que es function indelegable del Estado la defensa de la dignidad de la persona 
humana, la preservación de su salud y la calidad de vida de los habitants”. 
42  Recital 3 states, “Que los avances cientificos que son de conocimiento público posibilitan la 
realización de experimentos de clonación humana que plantean problemas éticos y morales que se 
contraponen a las pautas y valores culturales propios de neustro pueblo”. 
43  Recital 6 states, “Que, igualmente, ha tomado conocimiento de las opinions formuladas por 
representantes de distintos credos religiosos e institutciones cientificos y de las deciciones adoptadas por 
gobiernos de diversos países fijando posiciones concretas al respecto”. 
(individual), and are the values identified consistently realised?  One can infer from the 
text and tenor of the instrument that Argentina’s approach to hESCR may be similarly 
restrictive.  If research involving therapeutic cloning infringes or is an affront to the 
dignity and sanctity of the individual, then, to be consistent, Argentina should adopt a 
prohibitive or restrictive position on hESCR, or at least offer some protection for the 
dignity and sanctity of the embryo and the individual in the hESCR. 
However, there is no legal protection (of the dignity and sanctity) of the embryo 
or (of the dignity and autonomy) of the individual participant/donor in either the 1997 
Decree or in any other enforceable regulatory instrument.44  The practical consequences 
of this carving out of cloning for particular attention, combined with silence on other 
issues, would seem to be that both the use of surplus IVF embryos and the gestation of 
embryos for obtaining hESCs for research is permitted.  Similarly, given the legislative 
silence on the issue of international collaborations and the importation of SC lines, it 
would seem that both (1) the importation and use of SC lines derived from surplus 
embryos, and (2) the importation and use of SC lines derived from therapeutic cloning, is 
also permitted. 
In light of this apparent permissiveness, which seems out of step with the 1997 
Decree, one would hope for some guidance – either in the 1997 Decree or some related 
instrument (given Recital 4, which specifies the need to regulate practices associated with 
cloning and human experimentation45) – regarding Argentina’s position on: 
 
• the status of the embryo and a definition of same;46 
 
• when (or whether) the embryo can be used to derive SCs for research purposes; 
 
• the status of and protections for individuals participating in SCR and/or the 
related fields of IVF or human subject research more generally. 
 
However, none is offered and, presumably, limits on personal actions are left to non-
governmental instruments or personal morality/conscience. 
 
Legal protections for the collective 
 
As suggested above, cloning is a particularly important site for considerations of 
collective wellbeing, and issues relating to collective wellbeing require balancing actions 
and restrictions with a view to promoting a moral and just society.  In the present context, 
and to grossly oversimplify the problem, a balance must be struck between permissive, 
human rights-based, and solidarity- and autonomy-inspired scientific freedom, on the one 
hand, and restrictive, risk-based, and dignity- and sanctity-inspired limitations, on the 
other hand.  Does the instrument offer guidance on and (moral) justification for the 
balance it has struck via its operative provisions? 
                                                 
44  L. Baranao, President, National Agency for the Promotion of Science & Technology, 
representations made at informal meeting in Edinburgh on October 26, 2006.  The Argentine Ministry of 
Health has commenced work on human subject research guidelines, but no results have yet been published: 
F. Arzuaga, supra, note 40. 
45  Recital 4 states, “Que, por ello, resulta de urgente necesidad reglamentar, controlar y fiscalizar 
todas las actividades relacionadas con los experimentos de clonación, en particular con seres humanos”. 
46  The importance of such a definition and its absence in Argentina is noted in R. Isasi et al. Legal 
and Ethical Approaches to Stem Cell and Cloning Research: A Comparative Analysis of Policies in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa. J Law Med. & Ethics. 2004; 32: 626-638. 
The 1997 Decree does, by virtue of its explicit prohibition of cloning in Article 1, 
offer some (minimal) guidance on the balance deemed appropriate for Argentina with 
respect to the scope of health research.  Unfortunately, little can be said about the 
underlying values by which the state is being compelled to engage in this limits-setting 
exercise, although the same assumptions as made above likely apply.  Recital 3 hints at a 
moral awareness and Recital 1 references human dignity (now collectively understood as 
serving to promote the dignity of society as a whole).  It could be argued that this 
limitation sits uneasily with the recognition, also in Recital 1, of the state’s duty to 
preserve the health and quality of life of its citizens, a claim that seems to implicate the 
solidarity value. 
Ultimately, by virtue of the 1997 Decree, Argentina has implied that morally 
grounded health research is considered important, but that health research which 
implicates human cloning cannot, for some reason which is not made clear, be considered 
moral, and therefore cannot be pursued. 
 
Summation: a moral/legal disconnect 
 
Through the 1997 Decree, Argentina has attempted to regulate not hESCR but rather one 
scientific process (cloning) associated with hESCR (and particularly important to issues 
relating to collective wellbeing).  As such, it is conceded that evaluations of the 1997 
Decree as a regulatory instrument for hESCR may be unfair, but those above (and the 
conclusions below) are warranted insofar as they comment on (1) the general worth of 
the instrument, and (2) its potential impact on hESCR, in whose orbit it obviously spins. 
With respect to the worth of the 1997 Decree in its own right as a regulator of 
research relying on cloning techniques, this minimalist instrument exhibits some terrific 
shortcomings, most particularly related to its potential efficacy.  It contains no provision 
for monitoring activities or enforcing compliance with its prohibition (or for furthering 
moral values embodied in its prohibition, which are, in any event, left undefined).  
Further, the 1997 Decree directs the Ministry of Health and Social Action to write a bill 
related to this matter (cloning and associated practices?) within 60 days.47  However, 
there has been no follow-up regulation addressing these matters or otherwise offering 
guidance relating to hESCR. 
With respect to the second point – the 1997 Decree’s impact on hESCR – when 
measured against its own disclosed awareness of regulatory need in this area, its utility is 
little better.  For example, Recital 2 stipulates the need to ‘ensure and guarantee’ the 
correct utilisation of techniques and procedures applicable to human beings.48  Similarly, 
Recital 4 notes ‘the urgent need to regulate and control all activities associated with 
cloning, especially experiments involving human beings’.49  However, its application is 
limited to cloning and it ignores hESCR, inarguably a procedure/technique both 
‘associated with’ cloning and ‘applicable to’ human beings.  And again, as noted above, 
no further regulation addressing these matters has been adopted. 
On balance, Argentina’s attempt at regulation could be characterised as morally 
incoherent, socially inadequate, and, in light of the importance of deliberative democracy 
noted above, democratically deficient: 
 
                                                 
47  Article 2 states, “Encomiéndase al Ministerio de Salud y Accion Social que, en un plazo no mayor 
de Sesanta (60) días, elabore el proyecto de ley respective”. 
48  Recital 2, which states, “Que, asimismo, el Estado debe asegurar y garanatizar el correcto empleo 
de los procedimientos y técnicas de uso y aplicación en los seres humanos”. 
49  Recital 4. 
• Morally Incoherent: Argentina’s approach exposes an apparent disconnect 
between the broad, fundamental values (apparently) held by Argentine society 
and the official legal position which obtains (with respect to hESCR).  With 
respect to its value-position, Argentina has: (1) ratified the American Convention 
on Human Rights (1969),50 which states that every person has the right to have 
his life protected by law from the moment of conception;51 and (2) 
constitutionally entrenched catholic dogma,52 which views the creation of 
embryos for research purposes as the creation of ‘sacrificial victims predestined 
to be immolated on the alter of scientific progress’.53  Thus, although Argentina’s 
legal and constitutional character and conservative social history suggest that it 
should hold the ‘restrictive position’ outlined in Part I, the regulatory status of 
hESCR does not reflect these positions.  The regulatory position is that only the 
performance of SCNT for deriving (1) hESCs for research, or (2) embryos for 
reproduction, is forbidden.  One might claim that autonomy (manifesting respect 
for others by allowing them to make decisions for themselves) is exposed by this 
state of affairs.  Researchers (and companies) are permitted to pursue their work 
largely unfettered by regulatory limitations or oversight, and one can only hope 
that they will work toward ends that are socially useful.  However, one can 
contest this proposition, arguing that the researcher liberty which apparently 
prevails does not ‘promote’ autonomy; it does not create space/opportunity to do 
a particular thing or range of things.  It is therefore stretching the inference to 
claim that inactivity can masquerade as respect for autonomy. 
 
• Socially Inadequate:  A number of circumstances which obtain in Argentina make 
the unregulated and unsupervised advancement of SCR potentially dangerous.  
First, although some treatments have been administered for years (eg: bone 
marrow transplants for leukaemia patients54) and research is advancing apace (eg: 
SCs are being used to examine protein, gene and cancer functions and to promote 
healing in neural fibres55), fundamental hurdles remain to our understanding of 
how SCs work inside and outside the body (eg: SC lines are difficult to maintain, 
have yet to efficiently produced large quantities of cells, and experience random 
differentiation and genetic instability, and the movement and behaviour of SCs 
                                                 
50  American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, OAS Treaty Series, No. 36. 
51  Ibid: Article 4. 
52  See s. 2, Argentinean Constitution 1853. Available at 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ar00000_.html, which obliges the federal government to ‘support the 
Roman Catholic Apostolic religion’. 
53  Pontifical Academy for Life. The Dignity of Human Procreation and Reproductive Technologies: 
Anthropological and Ethical Aspects. 2004. Available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pont-
acd_life_doc_20040316_x-gen-assembly-final_en.html [Accessed 31 Oct 2006].  Indeed, it has been noted 
that Latin American legislators receive mandates from the Vatican and frequently act under Vatican 
morality rather than exercise their own free choice: F. Zegers-Hochschild. Attitudes Towards Reproduction 
in Latin America: Teachings from the Use of Modern Reproductive Technologies. Hum Reproduction 
Update. 1999; 5: 21-25.  This deference to the church goes so far as to criminalising abortion in all 
circumstances and refraining from legislating on IVF: see E. Rivera-Lopez. Ethics and Genetics in Latin 
America. Developing World Bioethics. 2002; 2: 11-20. 
54  Chapman et al., op. cit. note 3. 
55  Devolder, op. cit. note 4; Corrigan et al., op. cit. note 26; E. Singer. Stem Cell Mix Helps 
Paralyzed Rats Walk. 2006. Available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=17029 [Accessed 29 Sep 2006]; S. 
Kadereit & P. Hines. An Overview of Stem Cell Research. New Eng LR. 2005; 39: 607-622, p. 613. 
introduced into a natural environment cannot yet be predicted56).  Second, the 
usual shackles of developing country innovation (eg: underdeveloped technical, 
financial and legal capacity) are only partially present in Argentina, which has 
already taken many positive steps to build its SCR capacity and is now advanced 
in its health research and SCR activities.  With respect to the former, although its 
overall R&D spending is relatively low by international standards (ie: in 2004, 
R&D spending represented 0.44% of GDP, and of that, 14% related to health 
research), Argentina is one of the top 25 most productive research countries and 
is listed as a world player in SCR spending.57  With respect to treatments, adult 
SC-based cerebral infarction treatments and diabetic insulin production 
treatments have been administered to patients,58 and multi-centre international SC 
collaborations are being pursued with respect to congestive heart failure.59  Third, 
biotechnology (and SCR) represents an opportunity for developing countries like 
Argentina to build capacity alongside developed countries, thereby blurring the 
developed/developing divide (ie: it represents a ‘leapfrog’ technology similar to 
mobile phones).60  For this to occur and for maximum benefit to be realised, an 
innovation-friendly environment must be fostered.  Such an environment does not 
entail abdication of moral limits or public oversight, but is characterised by 
regulatory clarity and flexibility.61 
 
• Democratically Deficient:  Argentina is often described as ‘hyper-presidential’ 
because of the Constitutional emphasis on the President’s superiority and his 
practical capability, through decrees and vetoes, to exercise legislative authority 
in a unilateral and discretionary way.62  The 1997 Decree is an example of a 
Presidential exercise of authority; indeed, it is an example of a ‘need-and-
urgency’ decree, a form of legislative action introduced in the 1980s and 
                                                 
56  Kadereit & Hines, ibid; Select Committee, op. cit. note 6, at para. 2.13; Shaw, op. cit. note 21, p. 
37; E. Singer. Turning Stem Cells into Tissues. 2006. Available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=16374 [Accessed 29 Sep 2006]; S. 
Ertelt. MIT Prof: Embryonic Stem Cell Research Nowhere Close to Helping Patients. 2006. Available at 
http://www.lifenews.com/printpage.php [Accessed 12 Oct 2006]. 
57  See Biocrawler, Stem Cell. 2006. Available at http://www.biocrawler.com/encyclopedia/stem_cell 
[Accessed 12 Oct 2006]; C. Morel et al. Health Innovation Networks to Help Developing Countries 
Address Neglected Diseases. Science. 2005; 309: 401-403.  This is in contrast to the dismal state of science 
funding in 2002, the height of Argentina’s economic crisis: C. Marzuola. Argentina’s Crisis Heralds Time 
of Torment for Scientists. Nature. 2002; 415: 104. 
58  See Greenwood et al., op. cit note 7, p. 68; H. Pilcher. Bone Marrow Stem Cells Help Mend 
Broken Hearts. 2004. Available at http://www.bioedonline.org/news/news.cfm?art=936 [Accessed 30 Oct 
2006]; Medical News Today. Stem Cells Implanted in Brain of Patient Who Suffered a Cerebral Infarction. 
2005. Available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=25613 [Accessed 3 Oct 
2006]. 
59  Greenwood et al., ibid, p. 68.  Argentina is constitutionally obliged to foster international 
relationships and pursue international trade opportunities: s. 27, Argentinean Constitution 1853. 
60  E. DeSilva. Biotechnology: Developing Countries and Globalization. World J of Micro & Biotech. 
1998; 14: 463-486, claims that the globalisation of biotechnology acknowledges the participation of 
developing countries in emerging markets of novel bioproducts. 
61  This endeavour comprises one of the “grand challenges” identified by F. Collins et al. A Vision 
for the Future of Genomics Research: A Blueprint for the Genomic Era. Nature. 2003; 422: 835-847. 
62  M. Llanos. Understanding Presidential Power in Argentina: A Study of the Policy of Privatisation 
in the 1990s. J Latin Am Studies. 2001; 33: 67-99.  Indeed, between 1983 and 1995, approximately half of 
all Argentine legislation originated in the executive: B. Lamounier. Strengthening the Role of Legislatures 
in Hemispheric Relations. 2002. Available at 
http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/2002/fall/legislatures.pdf [Accessed 23 May 2007]. 
subsequently validated by the Supreme Court,63 whereby the President identifies 
an area of emergency or urgency and issues binding legislation thereon with little 
or no democratic participation or oversight.  Although the Legislature has the 
power to approve or amend decrees, many are met with silence (ie: tacit approval) 
and, where they are amended, can be returned to their original form via the 
President’s veto power.64  Given this environment, and the legislative inactivity 
which followed the 1997 Decree, it can fairly be characterised as a top-down and 
not deliberatively conceived instrument. 
 
In short, and on the whole, Argentina’s regulatory situation is fairly characterised as 
unsatisfactory.  To its credit, Argentina has recognised this, and has undertaken 
preliminary steps toward a new state of governance.65  One can only hope that it takes 
this opportunity to develop a morally grounded and more comprehensive regime for SCR 
which offers those working in this controversial field sound and explicit guidance and a 
means to test boundaries.  Despite the level of SCR activity already underway in 
Argentina, one might equally hope that stakeholders will seriously consider the social 
implications of such cost-intensive research (resulting in cost-intensive treatments) given 
Argentina’s economic inequity and healthcare fragility.66  Of course, given the 
government’s multiple roles, including strengthening and modernising the economy and 
closing the developing/developed divide so that the welfare of all Argentineans is 




Stakeholders are confronted by a society that is increasingly complex and confusing 
(characterised, as it is, by rising populations, greater interconnectedness, and an 
increasing number and scope of human activities).  Examples of this abound, but a 
                                                 
63  Peralta v. Estado Nacional, (1991) 141 El  Derecho  519-548 (SCA).  This was the most 
controversial in a series of Supreme Court cases which extended the President’s tenuous and previously 
rarely used power of rule by decree.  For a discussion of this and other cases and the ‘creep’ of the 
President’s legislative power, see C. Larkins. The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina. 
Comparative Politics. 1998; 30: 423-442; K. Eaton. The Logic of Congressional Delegation: Explaining 
Argentine Economic Reform. Latin Am Res Rev. 2001; 36: 97-117; R. Chavez. The Evolution of Judicial 
Autonomy in Argentina: Establishing the Rule of Law in an Ultrapresidential System. J Latin Am Studies 
2004; 36: 451-478; H. Fix-Zamudio. Emergency Power and Defence of the Constitution. Mex Law Rev. 
2007; 7: 801-860. 
64  G. Negretto. Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases 
of Brazil and Argentina. Compative Pol Studies. 2004; 37: 531-562. 
65  Arzuaga, op. cit. note 38; Baranao, op. cit. note 44.  In April 2004, the Committee of Ethics in 
Science & Technology urged the government to lift its blanket ban on cloning so as to allow therapeutic 
cloning, and to rescind its support for the UN Resolution which would ban all forms of cloning: R. 
Sametband. Argentina Urged to Support ‘Therapeutic’ Cloning. 2004. Available at 
http://www.scidev.net/News/index.cfm?fuseaction=readNews&itemid=1380&language=1 [Accessed 31 
Oct 2006]. 
66  For more on the former, see C. Valdovinos. Growth, Inequality and Social Equity in Argentina. En 
Breve. 2005; 82: 1-4; L. Gasparini et al. Argentina: Monitoring Socio-Economic Conditions in Argentina, 
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 2005. Available at 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/wdscontentserver/wdsp/ib/2005/07/15/000011823_200507
15164315/rendered/pdf/329490v10argen1rsion0lcshd01public1.pf [Accessed 15 Feb 2007].  For more on 
the state of healthcare, see J. Uribe & N. Schwab. The Argentine Health Sector in the Context of the Crisis. 
2002. Available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/lac/lacinfoclient.nsf/d29684951174975c85256735007fef12/3d29a0ed02294
a8b85256db10058dbdd/$file/argentinapabp6.pdf [Accessed 15 Feb 2007]. 
particularly relevant one given the present context is the biomedicalisation of society.  
Under this process, aspects of life previously outside the jurisdiction of medicine are 
increasingly viewed as medical problems.  This social transformation is facilitated by 
new biotechnologies, which are transforming diagnostic and treatment options.67  A 
consequence of this social complexity and the (new) moral pluralism that it engenders is 
that the law must regulate relations and activities that were previously unregulated or 
regulated solely by adherence to (agreed) moral practices; the law is called upon to 
perform more contested and burdensome functions in the governance of society. 
One activity that the law is being called upon to respond to is that of biotech 
innovation and, more particularly, SCR, which is shaped by two core phenomena that 
make voluntary reliance on personal morality inadequate, namely disease and 
commercialisation: 
 
• Disease:  Chronic, degenerative and acute diseases visit massive economic and 
psychological costs on societies, both developed and developing; in many cases, 
mortality rates are climbing and quality of life (and care) are dropping.  
Moreover, these diseases increasingly transcend national boundaries (eg: HIV, 
SARS, Avian Flu).  In such a setting, stakeholders (governments, commercial 
enterprises, healthcarers, patients groups) are turning to innovative avenues of 
health research like SCR to provide new, novel and cost-effective means of 
treating disease.  As activities increase, actor pools expand, and capabilities 
improve, clear and comprehensive regulation becomes more important. 
 
• Commercialisation:  The direction of biotech and genomic innovation/evolution 
is driven in large part by corporate agendas, themselves influenced by what is 
perceived to be most lucrative in global markets.68  Contributing to this 
phenomenon is the fact that academic institution and private company 
relationships are both increasing and being strengthened.69  In consequence, 
healthcare research (and SCR) regulation is becoming an important mechanism of 
corporate conduct / business practice regulation, as well as an important element 
of delivering useful healthcare. 
 
Given the above, and the fact that SCR is an increasingly prevalent and deeply divisive 
aspect of a quickly evolving social setting, and moreover it is one which incites (often 
polemical) intercourses amongst publics, decisive legal action preceded by adequate 
engagement exercises is essential.  Whole new subject-specific regimes are not always 
necessary, but a regime which considers all of the most important elements of the issue 
and offers a (reasonably) holistic and consistent response is warranted.  In the present 
case, that means regulation which: 
 
                                                 
67  For an exposition of this concept, see A. Clarke et al. Biomedicalization: Technoscientific 
Transformations of Health, Illness and US Biomedicine. Am Soc Rev. 2003; 68: 161-194, who argue that 
biomedicalisation contributes to and is manifested by (1) the politico-economic constitution of corporatised 
research, (2) the social emphasis on health risk and the means to monitor same, (3) the increasingly 
technoscientific nature medical practices, (4) the transformation of biomedical knowledge/information 
production, management, distribution and utilisation, and (5) the transformation of the human bodies and 
identities according to biotech undertstandings. 
68  K. Rajan. Subjects of Speculation: Emergent Life Sciences and Market Logics in the United States 
and India. Am Anthropologist. 2005; 107: 19-30. 
69  H. Moses et al. Collaborating with Industry – Choices for the Academic Medical Centre. New Eng 
J Med. 2002; 347: 1371-1375. 
• identifies the forms of health research society considers both acceptable and 
urgent; 
 
• structures the pursuit and influences the direction of that research to facilitate 
socially acceptable outputs (eg: addresses issues such as sourcing, storing and 
utilising SCs, and cloning human embryos for research purposes); and 
 
• articulates the limits of health research and research outputs so that they are 
timely and socially useful (eg: directly and through research commercialisation 
policies and product and process licensing practices). 
 
Such a regime has the potential to foster innovation while at the same time assuaging our 
worst fears of misconduct and misapplication. 
